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ABSTRACT
An overview of post World War II U.S. naval ship acqui-
sition policies and results is presented. Ihe major emphasis
in the overview is on seveml new control systems and policies
announced since 1970.
A case for development cf a comprehensive, life-cycle
ship success evaluation system is based on the current domi-
nant emphasis on short-term goal a'^hievement and the need for
a centralized, complete historical record and data bank on
ship acquisitions.
Success in naval f^hip acquisitions is defined as hpw
well actual results match a set of prioritized goals determ-
ined from the requirements of the military need. Individual
sets of criteria for performance, cost and schedule goals are
developed. Two schemes for evaluating overall ship

acqtilsition success, a "manual" model and a computerized
simulation model, are outlined.
The development of a comprehensive life-cycle ship
acquisition evaluation system is recommended. Further
study rnd development of certain aspects of the proposed
system are required.
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The following excerpts are taken from an article in
the March 4, 1976, edition of the Boston Globe .
" a shipbuilder (is) seeking payment of
$11,708 owed by the Federal Government
for a Navy (ship) the 300 foot (ship)
cost the Navy $75,000, plus a $16,000
overrun resulting from requested modifications
and delays in subcontract work, the
unpaid debt was a major reason why (the ship-
yard) ultimately went bankrupt "
Only the magnitude of the figures set this article apart from
similar, almost daily expositions. Generally such paltry
sums as above are not newsworthy. A $l6o,000,000 overrun
would be more like it. Actually the article refers to a
claim filed by descendants of the shipbuilder over a disputed
unpaid bill resulting from construction of a Union Navy gun-
boat during the Civil War. As in todays similar reports,
the ultimate "success" of the gunboat - or failure - is left
unaddressed.
In the conclusion of an exhaustive study by Dallen,
Merkl and Zlatoper of the Army's ill-fated main battle tank
(MBT-70) program, it is noted that various players in the

weapons acquisition process view "success" quite differ*-
1
ently. The authors observed that the strength of "sponsor-
ship" of a given weapons acquisition may Very well determine
whether or not the system eventually becomes part of the
nation's arsenal, regardless of the actual need or degree
of problems encountered in the development and acquisition.
The study authors, therefore, supported the "adoption of a





Improving the results of defense systems acquisition
depends on learning from past mistakes and past successes.
This requires consistent evaluation of project results with
as much objectivity as possible.
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the possi-
bility of such a system of evaluation of the degree of suc-
cess in naval ship acquisition. The objectives then are to
determine for naval ship acquisitions a criterion for succes
and investigate the feasibility and alternatives for such a
system.




THE COMPLEXITY OF TOE HARDWARE
Articles on naval ship acquisition usually begin with
acknowledgment that major defense weapons systems are the
most technically complex of any in existence. Perhaps the
most complex of weapons systems are naval ships.
Ships are the largest mobile objects on Earth and naval
vessels represent an integration of a myriad of major and
minor interlocking systems of which many are extremely com-
plex in their own right. A nuclear powered aircraft carrier
is over 1100 feet long, displaces over 90,000 tons, and is
propelled at speeds in excess of 30 knots by over 200,000
shaft horsepower. It is an airport with a capacity of 100
or more Jet aircraft. Additionally, it is a self contained
city with a population of 5,000 to 6,000 people. Its multi-
reactor nuclear plant, various electronic systems and air-
craft launching and recovery systems take years to design
and prove before they are ready for instiillation.
THE COMPLEXITY OF THE PROBLEM
The complexity of the hardware in question is perhaps
only matched by the complexity of the bureaucracy and pro-
cess concerned with the acquisition of the hardware. In
World War II, the entire Navy Department in Washington,
D.C, charged with directing a war effort involving at th§
9

peak of the war about 50,000 ships, consisted of about 200
people. Today there are in excess of 20,000 in the Washing-
ton, D.C., metropolitan area employed by the Navy. The ac-
tive fleet today consists of less than 500 ships.
It commonly takes ten to twelve years to conceive,
develop, design and construct a new U.S. Navy ship class.
The problems of long range fiscal and engineering forecast-
ing and planning in an unstable political and economic envir-
onment; and in the face of rapid technological advances, can
be "mind boggling" as one Ship Acquisition Project Manager
observed to the author.
THESIS OVERVIEW
The first chapter of the thesis is concerned with the
three rather distinct strategies employed in defense systems
acquisition since World War II. Though certainly not a com-
plete treatment, the reader should gain from Chapter I con-
siderable background information about the naval ship (and
other weapon systems) acquisition process and structure.
The major emphasis is on several new systems and policies
which have been formulated during the past five or six years,
The reader interested in a more complete analysis of the
defense weapons acquisition process, particularly during the
1960's, is referred to the recent and excellent book
3
Arming America by J. Ronald Pox.
10

Chapter II is concerned with the case for a comprehen-
sive, consistent evaluation system for naval ships. The
problem of acquisition projects outliving acquisition poli-
cies and strategies is discussed. Then, the existing over-
emphasis on "short-term" goal achievement, and the reasons
for that over-emphasis, at the expense of longer term, stra-
tegic goals, is investigated.
It is concluded in Chapter II that a comprehensive eval-
uation system could help shift the balance of goal emphasis
as well as fill the need for a centralized, complete histori-
cal record and data bemk for ship acquisitions. A position is
taken against use of the system for personnel performance
evaluation.
Chapter III begins with noting that relevancy, objectiv-
ity and feasibility are desirable traits of a success evalua-
tion system, but that total objectivity (requiring relevant,
strictly quantitative criteria) is unobtainable in a feasible
evaluation system for such a complex system.
The specification of goals and establishment of their
relative priorities from the need requirements are noted as
being prerequisites to the evaluation system. A definition
of success is also required and a definition preference for
naval ship acquisitions is offered.
The remainder of Chapter III is devoted to developing
sets of criteria for the three major goal areas: performance,
11

cost and schedule. Finally, two different approaches to
combining the individual criteria so that an overall assess-
ment of success is possible are discussed.
A manual evaluation model is outlined and the reasons
for adopting such a "low resource requirement" approach are
offered. The scheme is similar to those utilized by acquisi-
tion projects for evaluating contractor bid proposals.
A framework for the development of a much more sophisti-
cated, computerized simulation model is presented as an
alternative to the manual model. This approach requires
more resources to develop and use, but offers the possibility
of a more accurate and objective model as more of the complex
interdependencies of an acqulsitibm can be accounted for
and probabilistic criteria can be fully utilized.
T^e final conclusions and recommendations include
a) the success evaluation system outlined in this
thesis is imperfect but preferable to the current situation
(i.e. no long term structured system at all),
b) more work needs to be done in constructing evalna-
tion criteria and in implementing existing and planned systems
upon which the proposed evaluation system is built,
and,
c) the further specification and trial implementation
of the proposed system of success evaluation is recommended.
12
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AN OVERVIEW OF POST WWII U.S. NAVAL SHIP ACQUISITION
INTRODUCTION
A brief overview of the structure and process of naval
ship acquisition in the United States since World War II is
presented in this chapter. Three rather distinct periods are
indortifiable - the "Conventional" Period (until the early
1960* s), the "Concept Formulation/Contract Definition" or
"Total Package Procurement" Period (also called the "McNamara"
Period after the then Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara)
which began in the early 1960's and ended about I969* and the
"Current" Period. The major policies and characteristics of
the three periods differ considerably, but it is not always
possible to categorize a particular ship acquisition project
as being a result of the policies of any one particular peri-
od. For example, the nuclear powered aircraft carrier pro-
ject (the NIMITZ class of ships) was conceived during the
Conventional Period, continued through the Concept Formula-
tion/Contract Definition Period, and remains an ongoing pro-
ject. The project has characteristics of all three policy
periods. The ships were designed primarily by the Navy ("in
house") with the aid of a design agent, typical of the Con-
14

ventional and Current Periods. The three (or four) ships of
the class are being constructed under a multi-ship, multi-
year contract, a significant aspect of the Concept Formula-
tion/Contract Definition Period which has been continued.
Thus as the different periods are described, it should
be remembered that ship projects are long (often ten to
twelve years) and often transcend major acquisition policy
shifts. Additionally, like any large bureaucracy, new poli-
cies and strategies from top management (the Secretary of
Defense) often do not take effect at the working level (the
projects) for two or three years, if at mil.
THE BASIC PROCESS
Although policies and the organizational structure
for designing and acquiring ships for the U.S. Navy have
changed over the years, the basic process remains much the
same. Also, though differing in details and nomenclature,
the acquisition of ships is similar to the acquisition of
other major defense systems. A need is identified; a re-
quirement based on that need is established; a weapon sys-
tem is selected, developed, designed and constructed to fill
the requirement. Sometimes technological breakthroughs
motivate a new acquisition (termed "technology push") but
attempts are made to ensure that a legitimate need exists
15

prior to development and construction of the system.
The Navy and the other services are charged with "iden-
tifying needs and defining, developing and producing systems
1
to satisfy those needs." Establishing overall acquisition
policy, passing on the validity of needs, and monitoring the
performance of the services in carrying out the policy is
2
the purview of the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
National defense policies and objectives are provided by
the Secretary of Defense and translated by the Joint Chiefs
of Staff into military policies and objectives. Planning and
progrsimming by the services is keyed to these strategic ob-
jectives. Evaluation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff guidance
can lead to research and development objectives formulation
by the services to satisfy deficiencies in their capabili-
ties to perform their respective assigned missions and .
3
roles. The Program Objectives Memorandum is the budget for
this effort. Later, Program Objectives Memoranda will con-
tain the weapons systems which emerge from the research and
development efforts.
The Program Objectives Memoranda are part of the Depart-
ment of Defense Planning-Programming-Budgeting System (PPBS).
Funding for weapons systems is obtained through the PPBS.
However, a series of approvals by intra-service councils
T
Notes are listed at the end of each chapter.
16

and the top level Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council
is currently also required before a new weapons system is
constructed. The role of the Defense System Acquisition
Review Council will be discussed later in the chapter.
THE CONVENTIONAL PERIOD
At the end of World War II the U.S. Navy had 50,000
ships and there were 50 private and public shipyards work-
ing at or near capacity. Much of the fleet was "mothballed"
(retired from active service) at the end of the war and pro-
duction virtually ceased at the shipyards. During the Korean
conflict most of the required ships were reactivated from
the "mothball fleet". It was not until 1952 that the first
significant new shipbuilding since World War II - 31 major
5
ships - was directed.
The major policies and practices were characterized
by an iterative design process accomplished by the Navy
"in house" or by an independent design agent up to and includ-
ing a complete construction bid package, little documenta-
tion, major emphasis on ship performance, the splitting of
the production contracts between two or more shipbuilders,
and little involvement by the Office of the Secretary of
Defense. The acquisition process was basically decentral-
ized to the service level.
17

Initially, the entire design and procurement effort
would be coordinated by a few individuals. They relied
almost completely on the fixnctional organizations to perform
the necessary design and acquisition work required. Differ-
ent self-contained organizations would be responsible for
various systems on the ship. The "Gun Club" (Bureau of
Ordnance) was responsible for weapons for example. Later,
starting with the Polaris and other ballistic missile pro-
grams, the trend was towards project manager type organiza-
tions with varying degrees of self containment.
The reasons for spreading the production contracts
between several shipbuilders are not known for certain but
probably included the desires for rapid delivery of the ship
class and preservation of the production base of the ship-
yards. Alternatively, the primary reason may have simply
been regional political/economic pressures.
6
As depicted in Figure 1-1 , the "Conventional" approach
typically consisted of "in-house" talent formulating a ship
concept. Iliis activity included cost and feasibility studies
and advance research and development as necessary. Assuming
budgetary approval, increasingly refined and detailed design
stages, termed "Preliminary Design" and 'Contract Design"
followed. The approach was basically evolutionary and util-
7








































































































































The resulting product was a complete bid package, in-
cluding complete contract plans and specification. The
basic bid package could result in any number of procurement
contracts. Lead ships (the first of a class) were often
constructed in Navy shipyards. The amphibious ships LPD
7 through 15 were built under four separate contracts by
two shipbuilders. Exclusive of the costs of changes to the
contract, these ships were delivered to the Navy at an
average 125?^ of the initial contract price (fixed price) and
an average 27 months behind schedule. Escalation due to
inflation and claims against the government by the contrac-
tors accounted for most of the average 2^% cost overruns.
The above results became increasingly typical. Low or
negative profit performance by the contractors is thought to
have precipitated many of the claims. The basis of conten-
tion in the claims was usually a dispute over interpretation
of the often complex and detailed contract specifications.
Additionally, production facilities were becoming antiquated
and uncompetitive in the world market. Support of the ships
was costly and often inadequate due to a lack of standardi-




THE CONCEPT FORMULATION/CONTRACT DEFINITION
TOTAL PACKAGE PROCUREMENT PERIOD
A radically different approach to weapons design and
acquisition was formulated in the early 1960's by the
Office of the Secretary of Defense under Robert S» McNamara.
The new approach centralized major decision making authority
9
to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Objectives were
a) optimization of cost effectiveness by using systems
analysis techniques,
b) reduction or elimination of contractor claims
against the government by using contractor prepared perform-
ance oriented specifications vice government imposed detailed
specifications
,
c) reduction of cost overruns by transferring finan-
cial risk to the contractors for the design and acquisition
phases through the use of fixed price contracts^;
j
d) significant capitalization increases in shipbuild-
ing facilities by using multi-ship, multi-year contract
awards to a single shipbuilder that were expected to pro-
vide long term financial security enabling large scale capi-
talization and force expansion of facilities due to delivery
schedule demands,
e) reduce xmique systems and subsystems proliferation




introduce producability and innovation into the
designs by having the production contractor design the
system,
g) lower acquisition costs by taking advantage of the
"Learning Curve" effect through single producer serial pro-
duction {The "Learning Curve" had long been thought not to
apply to shipbuilding but several studies conducted during
the 1950 's and 1960's indicated otherwise.),
and,
h) arrive at more accurate total cost estimates and
reduce poor ship support by making the contractor responsi-
ble for all on board systems, crew training, initial repair
parts, and support facilities. (This policy is known as
"Total Package Procurement". Strictly speaking neither of
the Navy acquisitions being acquired under Concept Formula-
tion/Contract Definition policies are "Total Package Pro-
curement" as there is government furnished equipment involv-
ed.)
A project manager type organization was directed for
10
all major programs . As outlined in Figure I-l, the ser-
vices would still conduct advanced research and development
and identify the desired performance characteristics of the
new weapon system during the Concept Formulation stage.
Assuming approval by the Secretary of Defense, a Contract
Definition period would follow. A "Request for Proposal"
22

was prepared by the service and issued to selected shipbuil-
ders (when more than one were thought capable) to prepare
design analyses based on the specified performance charac-
teristics. The Request for Proposal contained both manda-
tory and desirable performance specifications and were sup-
posed to "encourage alternatives and stimulate initiative
11
and creativity by the contractors".
After evaluation of the proposals by the service, nor-
mally two or more contractors were given fixed price con-
tracts to develop a complete shipbuilding proposal. Required
in these proposals were contract plans and specifications,
detailed construction plans, management plans and a complete
12
analysis of the Life Cycle Costs. Life Cycle Costs meant
the total costs of acquisition and ownership - development,
13
production, deployment, operation and maintenance.
Total system tradeoffs were encouraged "to obtain,
within the mission and performance envelopes, an optimum
balance between total cost, schedule, and operational effect-
ivene* for the system". Operational effectiveness was defin-
ed to include "pure" performance, reliability, maintainabil-
ity and all other factors which affected the effectiveness of
the new system. The system was defined to include the re-
quired facilities, personnel, data, training equipment as
14
well as the the hardware itself.
23

No longer than six months was allowed for the Contract
Definition phase. This was followed by a Source Selection
process during which a detailed analysis of the proposals
was conducted by the procuring service. Negotiation was con-
ducted with one or more of the contractors and transfusion
of parts of one proposal into another was permitted. At the
end of the evaluation period a recommendation was sent to
the Office of the Secretary of Defense to award a multi-
year, multi-ship procurement contract to the contractor with
the best proposal, to conduct further Contract Definition,
or to defer or abandon the effort (unlikely). The single
contract awarded was fixed price, with or without incentive
clauses.
The Navy conducted three Concept Formulation/Contract
Definition ship competitions. The Past Deployment Logistics
Ship (FDL class) was not funded by Congress. The Amphibious
Helicopter Assault ships (LHA class) and the SPRUANCE class
destroyers (DD-963 class) are currently under construction.
Litton Industries won all three competitions.
CONCEPT FORMULATION/CONTRACT DEFINITION RESULTS
"Frankly gentlemen, in defense procurement, we
have a real mess on our hcuids.
The Honorable David Packard
Deputy Secretary of Defense, I970
It is too early to evaluate the final results of the
DIA and DD-963 shj.p acquisitions. The USS SPRUANCE (DD-963)
24

is the first ship delivered under either contract and was
accepted by the Navy in 1975. However, the acquisitions have
been beset by much the same problems that have characterized
defense weapons systems procurement the last two decades -
acquisition cost and schedule overruns of large proportions.
This is particularly true of the first of the contracts,
the LHA class. The first LHA is yet to be delivered auod is
several years behind the original schedule. A large claim
against the government by Litton over the contract is pend-
ing and the contract has already been renegotiated (upwards
in price and longer delivery times).
By the late 1960's, cost and schedule overruns and
performance shortfalls of new major weapons systems were
daily newspaper fare. In 1971 the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Financial Management (Comptroller) conducted a
16
survey of 35 major development and production programs.
Only two of the programs were found to be on, or ahead of,
schedule. That sajne year the General Accounting Office
made a survey of 61 weapon systems and found that cost esti-
mates for them had increased $33.4 billion over the initial
17
estimates. Contractor costs soared and profits plummeted.
Huge cost and schedule problems in the C-5A aircraft were
overshadowed in 1971 when cracks developed in the engine
18
mountings. The term "contractor bailout" became a house-
hold word as one producer after another threatened to cease
production unless relief from the fixed price contracts was
provided. 25

By 1970 a number of studies had found serious flaws
in the management of the weapons acquisition process.
The President's Blue Ribbon Panel, The National Security
Industrial Association, the Defense Science Board Task
Force on Research and Development Management, the Aero-
space Industries Association, and the General Accounting
Office conducted studies which all sounded very much the
same theme. A March 1970 Logistics Management Institute
19
report summarized the most common criticisms as follows:
" First is the observation that the weapons
acquisition process apparently is out of
control. Initial time and cost estimates -
and even updated estimates - cannot be depen-
ded upon. Mandatory engineering changes arise
continually throughout the process. Manage-
ment information and control systems do not
identify impending problems in time for pre-
ventive action to be taken.
Second is the claim that bargaining positions
are unbalanced; first one side, the the other
has the advantage. The theory of counter-
vailing pressures acting to produce fair and
realistic contract terms does not hold. With
emphasis on economies of scale and series pro-
duction there are only a small number of
26

weapon systems competitions each year and
prospective contractors believe that their
very existence may be Jeopardized by failure
to win. Hence the Department of Defense (DOD)
is in the dominant position and can compel
an unreasonable bargain. Following award
of the contract, the DOD, coimnitted to the
timely success of the program, is in the
weaker position as the sole source contrac-
tor negotiates for contract changes, prod-
uct acceptance, and follow-on business.
Third is that incentives both for effin-
dent operation and for candor about expec-
tations are lacking. Heavy reliance on
historical costs in pricing, lack of ade-
quate consideration of capital required
in negotiating profit rates, and the high
risk of low future utilization of contrac-
tor owned facilities impede investment and
modernization of plant. The hazard to pro-
gram survival, of high cost, long duration,
or looming technical difficulties, as each
program competes with others in and out of
the DOD, motivates extreme: optimism by
DOD and contractor personnel alike.
27

Fourth are allegations of confusion, con-
nivance, and deception by the DOD-con-
tractor combination. Close cooperation
and common interest are held in contrast
to the arm's length relationship prefer-
red by much of regulation and policy.
Policy notwithstanding, the military
departments receive advice and assistance
from prospective contractors in prepara-
tion of Requests for Proposals. Contrac-
tors receive aid from government person-
nel in performance of contracts. Contracts
fail as instruments of control."
On May 28, 1970, Deputy Secretary of Defense David
Packard issued a memorandum which stated that the Total
Package Procurement approach to developing and acquiring
major weapon systems was unsatisfactory and that a new
20
policy would soon be established. The Navy was still
years away from delivery of its first ship procured under
the cancelled policy. Whether or not the long term objec-
tives of the Concept Formulation/Contract Definition/Total
Package Procurement Period will be achieved for the Navy
ships remains to be seen. It is a fact that the sole source
multi-year contracts resulted in the construction by Litton
of a new shipyard at Pascagoula, Mississippi. Interviews
28

conducted by the author with project personnel brought out
the beliefs of several that the policies were never given a
fair chance. This resulted from the failures of the F-111
and C-5A aircraft procurements in particular and the problems
that Litton was experiencing in developing an adequate design
and production force and in making the new facility operas
tionally efficient.
THE CURRENT PERIOD
The major policies and trends of new ship acquisition
since the demise of Concept Rjrmulation/Contract Definition
include
a) emphasis on constrained design ("Design- to- Cost"),
b) emphasis on proven hardware ("Ply-before-you-Buy"),
c) required review and approval to proceed by the
Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council at key milestones,
d) a prohibition against Total Package Procurement
(linkage of system development and production under a single
contract),




flexibility in contract type and liberalization
of contract escalation (due to inflation) clauses,








The cancellation of the key top level policy directive
for the Concept Formulation/Contract Definition period in
1970 left a guidance void that was not formally filled until
the issuance of Department of Defense Directive 5000>.l,
"Acquisition of Major Defense Systems", on July 13, 1971.
It was during this same period that then Chief of Naval
Operations Zumwalt directed the rapid development of a large
class of austere, relatively Inexpensive Guided Missile Fri-
gates (FFG class, formerly the Patrol Frigate or PF class)
22
to bolster the size of the rapidly diminishing fleet.
After a year of feasibility studies > Admiral Zumwalt
directed that the design would not violate constraints which
were set on the average "follow" (after the first) ship
23
acquisition cost and fully loaded ship displacement. He
later added a third constraint on the maximum number of
24
accomodations on the ship. Performance capability above
the minimum specified was to be traded off to stay within
the constraints. This method of ship design, commonly termed
"Design-to-Cost", was revolutionary to the Navy, but is com-
mon in industry for new product development.
30

A major program consideration of current acquisition
policy is that "discrete cost elements (e.g. unit produc-
tion cost, operating and support cost) shall be translated
25
into "design to" requirements". In October 1973 the major
services' material commands Jointly issued a "Joint Design-
26
to-Cost Guide". This directive requires that "Design-to-
Cost be used for major systems except that
a) "Major weapons systems which for reasons of
national security necessarily push the state-of-the-art
should stress performance. In such cases, unit production
cost goals will be applied and tracked but will be subordi-
nate to performance goals."
and,
b) "Major weapons systems where the assessed need
is sufficiently urgent should strtps the schedule. In such
cases, unit protluction cost goals will be applied and tracked
but will be subordinate to schedule goals."
Implementation of the above exceptions requires Secretary of
Defense approval. The TRIDENT strategic ballistic missile
submarine class is such an example.
Historically, performance requirements for new ships
had been dictated by the Chief of Naval Operations to the
28
material command in brief "single sheet characteristics".
These were used by the material command "to develop prelim-
inary designs and cost estimates leading to more detailed




specifications." Costs were considered but were usually
secondary to maximizing performance. As "Design-to-Cost"
elevated the Importance of acquisition cost to the same level
as performance in the design process, a new iterative perfor-
mance-cost tradeoff dialogue between the customer (Chief of
Naval Operations) and producer (Chief of Naval Material)
organizations was required. "Top Level Requirements and
Top Level Specifications for the development of naval ships".
Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 9010.300, was issued
early in 1974. It details a procedure which provides for a
working group to develop the performance parameters for a
baseline ship which will meet the established mission re-
quirements. The group also specifies allowable variations
in performance parameters and alternative system selections
30
for the ship class.
After a period of Feasibility Studies during which the
impact of the alternative performance parameters and systems
selections are evaluated, the Chief of Naval Operations
organization starts preparation of a Draft Top Level Require-
ments document. This document is revised as the Naval Mater-
ial Commajid (parent command of the Naval Sea Systems Command
for whom acquisition projects directly work) develops a con-
ceptual design for the ship class and provides cost and
design information to the Chief of Naval Operations.
Assuming approval by the Chief of Naval Operations to proceed
32

with a selected design, a "Conceptual Baseline" and a "Cost
Goal" for the average follow ship acquisition costs are pre-
sented to the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council
which is composed of high level officials in the Office of
the Secretary of Defense. If council and Secretary of
Defense approval is given to proceed into "Preliminary
Design", a Draft Top Level Specifications document is started
by the Naval Material Command (actually the acquisition
project). This companion document to the Top Level Require-
ments "translates the Top Level Requirements into a physical
31
ship description". The contents of the two documents are
discussed in Chapter III. The process phasing is presented
32
graphically in Figure 1-2.
The Naval Sea Systems Command recently issued a "Design-
33
to-Cost Guide for Ship Acquisition" . Ihis directive spe-
cifies that the procedure of "Desgin-to-Cost" will be utili-
zed for all ship acquisitions for which a Top Level Require-
ments document is prepared. It exempts, as do most ship
acquisition directive^ nuclear propulsion plants and nuclear
support facilities under the cognizance of Admiral Hyman G.
Rickover, Director of Naval Reactors. The Chief of Naval
Operations has stated that a Top Level Requirements and Top
Level Specifications will be developed for "all new ship de-
34
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It had been intended that before permission to proceed
into Contract Definition would be granted, "primarily engine-
ering rather than experimental effort" would be required and
the technology needed would be "well in hand". However
the large performance shortfalls, schedule delays and cost
increases referred to in the previous section were at least
partially a result of overly optimistic estimates of ultimate
system capabilities and the time required to design and
36
perfect them. There had been a great deal of reliance on
"paper studies" rather than on actual performance demonstra-
tions. Thus, a major program consideration of the Current
37
Period is that
"Programs shall be structured and resources
allocated to ensure that the demonstration
of actual achievement of program objectives
is the pacing function.
"
A supporting Department of Defense directive was issued in
January of 1973 to establish test and evaluation policy for
38
the acquisition of defense systems. This policy emphasizes
a) the need to conduct test and evaluation as early





b) acquisition schedules will be based on the comple-
tion of test and evaluation milestones prior to key decision
points (Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council approval
points. See Figure 1-2.)
The key element which has grown from recognition of the
need for increased test and evaluation during the acquisition
process has been prototyping. This is commonly known as the
"Ply-before-you-Buy" policy and is currently being used in
the acquisition of new aircraft and in the Navy's surface
effect ships and NATO patrol hydrofoil programs. It is not
feasible, however, to build and evaluate prototypes prior to
beginning follow ship design and production for large ships.
The time required, small numbers involved (one or two in some
cases) and threat of obsolescence dictate a modified "KLy-
before-you-Buy" approach.
The Guided Missile Frigate Program developed a plan
which provided for
a) early construction of Land Based Test Sites for
complete propulsion and combat systems
and,
b) a delay of two years between construction contract
39
awards for the lead and follow ships.
This plan permits testing of the two major "high risk"
subsystems prior to installation on the lead (first) ship and
time to incorporate changes resulting from the entire test
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and evaluation program into the design of the follow ships.
The Land Based Test Sites will also be used for crew traiifp- .
ing.
THE DEFENSE SYSTEMS ACQUISITION REVIEW COUNCIL
The Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council (DSARC)
was established in the Office of the Secretary of Defense
40
by Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard in May, I969.
The purpose of the council reviews is to d^irwluttt* Ath^fcughly
the status of major defense systems acquisition projects at
three critical milestones which generally occur for ship
acquisitions as indicated in Figure 1-2.
Formal documentation for the DSARC reviews and decisions
is provided by the project prepared Decision Coordinating
Paper (formerly Development Concept Paper). It is a summary
document of not more than twenty pages that records the
primary information on a program including the thresholds,
issues and risks, need, the alternatives, the reviews,
rationale for the decision, and affordability. When signed
by the Secretary of Defense, it is the authority for the
service to proceed with the program (or whatever action the
Secretary of Defense directs). His decision sets the limits





A long series of Intra-service briefings and reviews
is generally required of an acquisition project prior to a
DSARC presentation.
COST ESTIMATING
By 1970, the credibility of the Department of Defense
concerning system acquisition cost estimates was extremely
low. When the new acquisition policy directive was issued
by Mr. Packard in 1971, it directed that "Traceability of
estimates and costing factors be maintained". In
December^ 1971, Mr. Packard issued a memorandum requiring
incorporation of independent (from program proponents) para-
metric cost analysis in Defense Systems Acquisition Review
Council presentations.
Parametric cost estimates are "based on quantified
relationships between the cost and physical performance
characteristics of past systems for initial program decle-
ions". Engineering cost estimates (normally used by acqui-
sition projects) are based on detailed design information.
Cost Information Reports (now Contractor Cost Data Reports)
submission requirements have been written into production
contracts in order to build a data base from which to develop
parametric cost estimating relationships.
Pox discusses a third estimating alternative for use in
46
preparing contract negotiation objectives. This technique,
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known as "should cost" analysis had its beginnings in the
civilian economy and was developed in the early 1960'8 for
the Department of Defense, under the direction of then Defense
Comptroller Robert N. Anthony. Pox describes the process as
follows
"This technique begins with an in depth analysis
of a contractor's management^ cost estimating^ and
production practices to identify and measure the
effects of poor performance. From a baseline devel-
oped by eliminating costs resulting from inefficien-
cies, projections are made for the current procure-
ment. The objective is to foster improved industrial
practices by setting realistic contract prices."
Under the approach, a team of experts in engineering,
pricing, auditing, procurement and management spend several
weeks at the contractor's facility. They review in detail
the company's operations and procedures. Standard industrial
engineering techniques are used to uncover inefficiencies.
Pox cites several examples of should-cost analyses
successes in reducing costs. He also notes that it is dif-
ficult to achieve high quality, factual investigations and
that there had been considerable resistance from within
contractor organizations and from within the Department of
Defense.
A Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) was established
39

in January 1972 in the Office of the Secretary of Defense
"to review the estimates presented and to develop uniform
47
criteria to be used ". 5y the time a permanent char-
ter for the CAIG was issued in 1973, its responsibilities
had grown to include, interalia, identification of where
efforts are needed to improve the cost estimating capabili-
48
ties of the services. Improvement of the validity and
tracking of cost estimates has recently been addressed by
the Secretary of the Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, and
49
Chief of Naval Material directives. None of the directives
refer to the "should-cost" technique of cost estimating.
A discussion of the provisions of the directives is contained
in Chapter III. Figure 1-3 shows the responsibilities for
ship cost estimating and the cost estimating organizational
50
relationships within the Navy.
CONTRACTOR COST AND SCHEDULE CONTROL
As more and more contractors failed to perform under
the Concept Formulation/Contract Definition Period fixed
price contracts, the need for increased government engage-
ment with the contractors was realized. The fixed price
contracts and lack of government involvement in the design
supposedly transferred any financial risks from the govern-
ment to the contractor and thus the role of the acquisition
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The current top level acquisition policy directive spee
cifles that "Contract type shall be consistent with all
program characteristics including risk," Also stipulated is
that "Cost type prime and subcontracts are preferred where
51
substantial development effort is involved." The use of
cost type contracts opens up the possibility of increased
government engagement with the contractor.
Apart from the lack of governmental control leverage
resulting from fixed price contracts, attempts at effective
contractor cost and schedule control by the projects has
52
historically been hampered by
a) a reluctance of the contractors to share what it
considers to be proprietary information,
b)the preoccupation of project managers with the
annual funding approval process and the continuity of funds
flow (funds control) as opposed to cost control,
c) the proliferation of various information and cost
control systems' imposed on contractors by the different
services and projects (validity of the information was often
lost in the translation from the contractor's system to the
government imposed system(s)),
d) the lack of inclusion in the reporting systems of
the budgeted value of work performed,
e) improper allocation of contractor costs between
overhead (indirect) and direct costs.
k?.

f) inability of the project personnel to evaluate
the detailed information they require of the contractor, and
lack of correspondence between reported data and the contrac-
tor's own data,
g) retroactive changing of finemcial plans to conform
to work performed to date (the "rubber baseline")
and,
h) contractor use of nonintegrated work breakdown
structures and nonintegrated charts of cost accounts (sum
of budget dollars for work at one level nay exceed budget
at next higher level).
In a survey conducted during the 1960's, Pox found that
most program managers were satisfied if their funds control
reports indicated that funds were being expended at the plan-
53
ned monthly rate and their PERT networks reports showed no
54
significant schedule slippage. Schedule network reporting
based on starts rather than completion, untimely or inaccur^
ate reporting, and the lack of performance of scheduled non-
critical path work all served to build in cost overruns which
often went undiscovered until it was too late to take any
meaningful cost or schedule control action.
In 1967 the Department of Defense issued a directive
55
title "Performance Measurement for Selected Acquisitions".
56
The system is summarized as follows
"Part One of the program requires that contractors
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use internal planning and control systems that
meet minimum government criteria. These criteria
are called the 'Cost and Schedule Control Systems
Criteria' (CSCSC).
Part Two of the program requires that contractors
regularly submit Cost PerCormance Reports which
contain information on the budgeted value of work
performed to date. (The criteria themselves do
not require the submission of any reports to the
government, but specify the reporting capabilities
which contractors' internal systems must have, and
the types of data which the systems should be able
to produce.) The contractor is free to design his
internal planning and control systems to correspond
to the manner in which he organizes his work units
and assigns responsibility for performing work."
An important concept in the reporting criteria is the
contract cost status reports must be based strictly on the
57
number of Jobs completed to date.
Five years after the CSCSC had been developed, only
16 defense contractors had been certified as complying with
the criteria. The Navy was singled out by the Senate Armed
Service Committee as being particularly slow in implementing
58
the new system. In I97I an additional twenty contractors
complied with the criteria and all three services were act-
44





It is certainly too early to make amy factual observa-
tions about the results achieved by the reforms instituted
since 1969-70 in the ship acquisition process. The Guided
Missile Frigate program, as indicated, pioneered many of
these reforms in the Navy. In addition to those aspects of
the Guided Missile Frigate acquisition plan already discus-
sed, a key element of the plan was to select a "lead" an6
a "secondary" contractor early in the design effort. The
function of the "lead" shipbuilder was to assist in the
"in-house" design effort and ultimately to build the first
ship under a "cost plus" type contract. The purpose of this
was to introduce producability into the design, to promote
design fam4.1iarlty and acceptance of performance responsibil-
60
ity by the contractor, and to reduce development time.
The "secondary" shipbuilder was involved to prevent the
introduction of producability bias by the "lead" shipbuilder
which would result in unfair advantage when bidding on the
follow ship contracts and to provide a "fallback" position
in case lead ship contract negotiations turned sour. When the
first increment follow ships fixed price contract bids were
received in late summer 1975> the Navy was dismayed to
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receive bids from only two contractors - the designated
"lead" and "secondary" contractors. Moreover, the bid prices
were well in excess of the "Design-to-Cost" constraint, -"
reportedly as much as 6o^ over. It can be speculated that
the lack of participation in the bidding by other shipbulld -
ers and the high bids submitted were due to one or more of
the following reasons
a) shipyard loading by other (primarily merchant
ship) contracts,
b) the poor profits and losses experience on previous
contracts,
c) a reluctance to accept the required engagement by
the government in the contractor's procedures and operations,
d) fear that the escalation provided for in the con-
tracts for inflation will be insufficient, as It has been In
the past,
and,
e) the Navy's cost estimate was far too low.
Whether or not the current difficulties in the Guided
Missile Frigate program are a result of past project diffi-
culties or an indication of the failures of the new reforms
is indeterminable at the present time. How many Guided
Missile Frigates (50 were originally planned) will ultimately
be built, whether or not contractor's will accept the desired
increased engagement by the government in "their affairs".
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pnd the future of constrained ship design are all open to
conjecture. The Navy's only other "Design-to-Cost" ship
class to date, the DG Aegis, was cancelled and replaced by
the nuclear powered Strike Cruiser (CSGN). Is is an "un-
constrained design and one not indicative of the 'Design-
61
to-Cost' concept."
Chapter II will consider the case for a comprehensive
and structured ship evaluation system.
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CHAPTER T CONCLUSIONS AND SUMMARY
Three distinguishable periods of naval ship acquisition
policy have occurred since WorDd War II. The periods are
referred to as the "Conventional", "Concept Formulation/
Contract Definition" or "Total Package Procurement", and
'Current".
The aprroaches have differed in the degree of centrali-
zation of control within the Department of Defense; contrac-
tor - government relationships; the degree of systems analy-
sis; whether the design was accomplished by the government,
private industry, or by both; and the types and numbers
of control systems.
The objectives have remained basically the same: to
deliver the ships needed for the nation's defense, when
they are needed, and at an affordable, promised price.
The visible results have also been similar - disappointing,
to say the least.
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THE CASE FOR A NAVAL SHIP EVALUATION SYSTEM
INTRODUCTION
This chapter con«'lders the major factors, s^ipporting
pptaMlshment ,'^f a comprehensive ship evaluation system.
Thes'^ factors include the historically short lived acqui-
sition policies (relative to project duration), over-emphasis
on short term ^oal achievement, and the need for a ship
acquisition life-cycle historical record and data bank.
It is concluded that successful establishment of a
comprehensive evaluation system will result in a better
basis than now exists for formulating high potential acqui-
sition system improvements and some desirable increase in
emphasis on longer term goal achievement. A danger in the
evaluation system will be the tendency to use its results
for personnel performance appraisal.
t PET'TER BASIS FOR ACQUISITION SYSTEM CHANGES IS NEEDED
As discussed in Chapter I, defense system acquisition
policies and strategies have been unstable relative to the
considerable length of time required to develop and construct
a new class of ships (often ten to twelve years). Three
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major departures in acquisition policy occured in less time
than it took to develop and procure the USS NIMITZ, the first
In a new class of nuclear powered aircraft carriers. The
primary emphasis in weapons system acquisition policy changed
from maximum technical performance during the Conventional
Period, to "cost effectiveness" over the life-cycle during
Concept Formulation/Contract Definition, to achieving
acceptable performance for the minimum acquisition cost
during the Current Period. Although the NIMITZ may partially
reflect parts of all these policies, the "die was cast" early
in its development, under the Conventional Period policies.
The Navy is paying a large price for the adaptability
and ease of conversion (to minimize life-cycle costs) design-
ed into the new SPRUANCE class destroyers (DD-963 class)
under construction by Litton. This was a keystone of the
Concept Formulation/Contract Definition strategy. The new
Guided Missile Frigate class, however, is a "tight" design
with small margins (reservations for future systems weight
and volume requirements). This is a direct result of the
acquisition cost and displacement constraints placed on the
design resulting from the Current Period policies.
It Is easy to forget when judging a ship which policies
were in effect when it was designed and constructed (and
also what the acquisition environment was like). Without a
formalized, consistent evaluation system which collects auid
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assesses data on the actual results of the acquisitions
throughout the ships' life-cycles, the Navy will never know
the degree of successes and failures realized under the
various acquisition policies and strategies. Without this
knowledge, changes to the acquisition system are reactionary
and often little more than "shots in the dark".
INCREASED EMPHASIS ON LONG TERM GOAL ACHIEVEMENT IS NEEDED
Short term goals in ship acquisition include those
concerned with acquisition cost and delivery schedule.
Longer term goals include minimizing total life cycle costs
and providing capability in the design to adapt successfully
to new and unforseen mission requirements and to counter
future threats. Both types of goals are important, depending
on the requirements of the need. The realities of the
political/economic environment strongly influence the
selection of goals and their attainment, as does the need
requirements. The following few sections will focus on
the reasons for dominant emphasis on short term goals and
why longer term goals may be more important.
SHORT TERM GOAL ATTAINMENT PRESSURES
There are a number of reasons why short term goals
achievement receives more emphasis in ship acquisition than
longer term goals achievement. Short term goals, generally
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attainable during the acquisition phase, are more easily-
quantified and measured. The short tenure (relative to the
development and acquisition time) of key participants increa-
ses the pressure to optimize short term goals. A typical
project will have two or three different project managers.
They are likely to achieve or fail promotion based on the
results of the acquisition foreseeable during their tenure.
One Ship Acquisition Project Manager interviewed by the
author noted that "For a successful project in this building,
bring it in within cost and on schedule. Unfortunately, the
fleet will not see it that way."
By "cost" the project manager meant "acquisition cost",
and "in this building" refers to the parent organization of
the project, the Naval Sea Systems Command. The last iine
indicates the project manager's awareness that the operators
are concerned with longer term goals. A senior Naval Material
Command (parent organization of the Naval Sea Systems Command)
executive recently prepared "lessons learned" from two troub-
led projects. He noted that
"Our current reward system does not encourage special
attention to that portion of the program which will
occur 'down the pike' on a subsequent project mana-
ger's watch. Our reward system recognizes near term
achievement. With the increased tour lengths of pro-
ject managers, this problem has been !parti6.11y alleviatjed."
The Concept Formulation/Contract Definition period policy
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directive required minimum tour lengths of three years for
1
project managers. Recent emphasis has been towards tours of
four or five years with relief occurring at major milestones.
The tenures of other key procurement participants are
normally less than the project's life. Key officials in the
Navy and the Department of Defense, military or civilian,
rarely are in office more than three or four years. Few
Congressmen, particiilarly Representatives, can afford to
empha^.ize long term goal achievement at the expense of short
term, risible results as n rf^c^ult of their frequent reelec-
tion rrquJrements. Additionally, Congress does not presently
have the capability to assess the long term results of acqui-
sition programs. Tar. end result is that many military and
public officials who sponsor and approve the acquisition of




The move away from minimizing life-cycle costs and tow-
ards tight control of acquisition costs by specifying acqui-
sition cost constraints as design param.eters was precipitated
by
a) the monujT.pntal cost overruns of the 1960's,







c) a rapidly aging and diminishing fleet.
A recent study of the Navy's acquisition system noted
"Changing national priorities have reduced
the percentage of the Federal Budget now
devoted to defense to the lowest point
since 1946."
and,
" the U. S. Navy today possesses the
lowest force level It has known since before
1950 "
Reporting and Control Systems Effects
4
Anthony observes that In business,
"Management control systems tend to measure
current performance, rather than long term
performance. That Is, they measure the
profit earned this year, rather than the
effect on future profits of actions taken
this year."
Hiere Is certainly a directly analagous situation In the
defense systems acquisition process. The Selected Acquisi-
tion Reports, submitted quarterly to Congress by major weap-
ons projects, contain a lengthy analysis of variances from
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acquisition cost estimates. The sections on technical per-
formance estimate changes Is brief and there is no provision
5
for life cycle costs in the reports.
Ponding
New weapons systems are funded annually by Congress.
The Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN) account carries
a five year obligation authority for the annual appropria-
tions. This account, until recently, covered new ship devel-
opment and production. Recently, funding of new ship devel-
opment and construction of the lead ship of a class has been
provided by the Research, Development, Testing and Evaluation
(R,D,T&E) account. This budget category only authorizes a
single year obligational authority. Long range planning is
extremely difficult under such a short funding time horizon.
Erratic congressional action on the yearly appropriations is
not uncommon, and this compounds the problem and serves to
emphasize short term goal achievement.
THE IMPORTANCE OF LONG TERM GOALS
The threat of obsolescence in new ships at the time
they are delivered for service is real. The missions and
threats they are designed to cope with may change dramatically
during the long development and acquisition period. In the
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average ship's thirty years service life, missions, threats
and available systems will continue to change as a result
of rapid strides in technology. Certainly the ultimately ^
Important test of ship performance is how it performs the
missions it is called upon to perform, whenever that might
be.
The cost to develop and acquire a new ship is typically
only about one fifth of the total expenditures over the life
6
cycle of the ship. Over emphasis on the short term goal of
minimum acquisition cost can not help but negatively impact
the total life cycle cost. Increased automation in a ship
results in smaller manning requirements, but the automation
increases the acquisition cost. Larger manning requirements,
however, significantly impact the operating costs both
through increased ship ^Ize (as much as 730 cubic feet per
man) and the dramatically increasing costs of wages and
benefits. Another example concerns the long life, low main*
tenance coatings and materials becoming available which are
costly to purchase but may favorably impact total life cycle
cost. Chief of Naval Operations Zumwalt realized the severe
impact on the increasingly limited Navy resources of the
high operating and maintenance costs of the aging fleet. He
embarked on a plan to eHmitiate rmj^t^ly many of the costly
old ships in order to free funds for new ship construction.
In conclusion, ship acquisition long term goals (e.g.
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minimum total life cycle costs and capability to adapt
rapidly to new threats and missions) are important but the
balance of pressures on the acquisition process are towards
short term goal achievement. A consistent and comprehensive
evaluation system, operable throughout the ship's life cycle,
can help shift this balance by evaluating and making visible
the degree of attainment of long term goals.
A COMPLETE HISTORICAL RECORD IS HEEDED
The recent effort to improve cost estimating within
the Department of Defense (see Chapter I) by the use of
comparative parametric cost estimates has been hampered by
the lack of historical return costs of previous weapons
acquisitions. Engineering cost estimates and actual design
control are developed along the lines of a work breakdown
structure in accordance with Military Standard 88l, "Work
Breakdown Structures for Defense Material Items".
However, the accrual accounting system established
July 1, 197^ f for the procurement appropriations uses a
different cost category breakdown which does not correlate
easily with the work breakdown structures used by the pro-
jects. A recent effort to develop a crosb referencing sys-
tem between the design and engineering cost estimating work
breakdown structures and the accounting system breakdown
failed. An additional difficulty in building a return cost
62

historical data base is the previously discussed contractor
reluctance to divulge actual costs.
The current increased emphasis on traceability of per-
formance « cost and schedule estimates was noted in Chapter I.
Historical records of the project are required to be main-
tained by the project staff but the records may or may not
be available to new projects and are of varying formats
and quality.
After the acquisition phase, a lot of cost and perform-
ance data is generated in different accounts and by different
systems. There are at least a half dozen different cost
accounts for the Navy which contain parts of the life cycle
costs of ships. Life cycle costs such as those of mainten-
ance, training and replenishment facilities and operations
are not always identified with the ship classes receiving
the support.
PSRFORNAlfCE DATA
Currently during acquisition, the performance of a ship
system is being demonstrated more rigorously than ever
before. Actual hardware demonstrations are replacing paper
estimates earlier in the process in many cases. At the end
of the acquisition phase, complete ship trials are conducted
by the Board of Inspection and Survey to assess the perform-
ance of the ships.
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After acquisition, there are numerous sources of inform-
ation about actual ship performance. In recent years, actual
combat performance has been available. In peacetime, ship's
undergo a constant series of inspections of variou* types.
They participate in fleet training exercises, undergo ship
"refresher training", and compete with other ships in their
operating groups for coveted "Efficiency" awards which are
based on the outcome of a series of standard exercises. The
Board of Inspection and Survey and the Propulsion Examining
Boards conduct periodic comprehensive inspections of material
and operating readiness. Information about the reliability,
maintainabiliy and performance of equipments is generated
from the "3M" system of scheduled preventive ^laintenaaee and
corrective maintenance reporting. Operational ships report
the status of their capabilities to perform mission require-
ments through the Joint Chiefs of Staff Force Status and
Identity Reports. Significant degradations due to equipment
amd system casualties or personnel deficiencies are reported
9
using the "Naval Combat Readiness Criteria".
Prom the above and other sources, pertinent data f trs
about the performance of the ships and their costs are
generated. To the author's knowledge however, there is no
concerted effort to collect and assimilate all the pertinent
data and utilize it to evaluate the long term worth of the




THE EyALUATION SYSTEM AND PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL
The evaluation system is not being proposed as a control
system. Control systemsare short horizon oriented and there
are sufficient and entirely adequate systems (see Chapter I)
in existence to help manage the acquisition process and eval-
uate the cost effectiveness of goal achievement during the
10
acquisition phase.
There are several reasons why the evaluation system to
be outlined in the next chapter should not be used fir personnel
performance appraisal. Personnel appraisal demands a degree
of fairness and objectivity that will not be attainable in a
system that is designed to evaluate the long term results of
a process as complex and long lived as a ship acquisition.
It may be true that the responsibility of management is to
be fair to subordinates, not necessarily to design a person-
nel appraisal system that is completely fair and objective
11 12
in itself. However, as noted by Christensen, et al,
"By far the most important problem of measure-
ment is that increased interest in the measure-
ment of performance against standards brings
increased danger that the executive evaluation
program may encourage performance which detracts
from rather than supports the overall strategy."
Tliis tendency results in actions which are directed
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towards optimizing the performance system results at the
expense of the projects goals
^
particularly long term goals.
The more quantitative and simplistic the evaluation criteria
the greater is the tendency. A common example which arises
in business is the evaluation of profit center managers on
simple return on investment. The reluctance of an executive
so evaluated to invest in new, more efficient but higher
book value production equipment is understandable but is
often detrimental to the long term profit performance of the
firm.
13
Lorange discusses the problem this way
"There is a danger that the performance tracking
process will lead to decision-making behavior
which violates the overall organizational goal
congruence requirement. This is partly due to
the "technical" measurement problems
These often stem from a desire to capture
complex and multi faceted phenomena by means
of a few variables "
The true function of a measurement system is to get
an idea of the problems limiting achievement rather than to
14
place blame. No single measure or measurement system
can totally assess the individuals contribution to intermed-
iate and long term results or to the efforts of others. This
is particularly true when the time horizon of long term goals
66

1b extremely long as in the case of ship acquisitions. As
an avowed purpose of the evaluation system is to increase
the emphasis on long term goal achievement, any temptation
to utilize the system for personnel appraisal should be
resisted.
CHAPTER II CONCLUSIONS
Unless improvement in the ship acquisition process is
to be left to chance, the degree of attainment of project
goals must be observed and measured. Currently, by far the
most emphasis is on attainment of short term goals e.g.
minimizing acquisition cost. The most important goals in
ship acquisition may be longer term in nature, e.g. minimi-
zation of total life cycle costs and performance adaptabil-
ity.
A consistent and comprehensive evaluation system which
assesses the degree of success of ship acquisitions should
be developed. A key function of the system will be to col-
lect and integrate the various data concerning life cycle
costs and performance as the data becomes available for the
different ship classes. The results contained in this
information will be evaluated against the goals of the pro-
ject, long and short term. The resulting assessments will
be used for formulating improvements to the acquisition
process. The historical data collected should also be
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of use for budgeting, improving estimating relationships
and providing "lessons learned" to new acquisitions.
The evaluation system should not be used for the apprai-
sal of personnel performance nor is it intended for acquisi-
tion phase project control.
Chapter III will consider the development of a naval
ship evaluation system, present individual sets of goals
criteria for the three major goal areas, and discuss two
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A SHIP SUCCESS EVALUATION SYSTEM
INTRODUCTION
In this chapter a framework for a ship evaluation system
is outlined. In the first part of the chapter, a discussion
of the desirablp traits of a ship evaluation system is presen-
ted. The prerequisites of the evaluation system include
establishment of the need, a set of prioritized goals based
on the need, and a definition of success in naval ship acqui-
sition. A preferred definition of success is offered.
The second part of Chapter III includes development of
sets of goal criteria for each of the three major goal areas.
This is followed by outlines of a simple manual model and
a more sophisticated, computerized simulation model for com-
bining the sets of criteria and arriving at an overall evalua-
tion of success. The latter model requires greater resources
but may result in a more valid and objective evaluation
scheme.
It is concluded that the proposed evaluation system
is feasible, can be designed so that the criteria are relevant
and the assessments arrived at, though not completely objec-





The desirable traits of a ship acquisition evaluation
system are much the same as those required of accounting
1
principles - relevancy, objectivity and feasibility. Rele-
vant in that the measure used is meaningful and useful,
objective to the extent that the assessment criteria is not
influenced by personal biases or Judgments and feasible
meaning that the costs of implementation and the complexity
of the system are within reason.
Total objectivity requires purely quantitative analyses.
This ideal is unobtainable when evaluating a system as com-
plex as a ship if relevancy and feasibility are to be main-
tained. The performance of a naval ship is particularly dif-
ficult to quantify completely. However, as the stated purpose
of the evaluation system is to determine success as an aid in
developing improvements in the acquisition process rather than
to serve as a control system per se, the necessary sacrifice
of objectivity is not so serious. The goal will be to utili-
ze single and combinative quantitative criteria as long as it
makes sense to do so; at the same time recognizing that employ-
ment of an "irrelevant criterion simply because it lends it-
2
self to quantification is a poor exchange far alleged otjjectivltyi'
EVALUATION SYSTEM PREREQUISITES
It is assumed *hat a legitimate and well defined military
need has been established and a ship has been selected as the
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best alternative system to satisfy that need.^ Although the
proposed evaluation system has been specifically excluded
from serving as a conventional control system, the basic
steps required to formulate it are similar: goal specifica-
tion, establishment of goal attainment criteria, results data
collection, and evaluation of the degree of goal attainment.
GOAL SPECIFICATION
The first requirement is that a set of goals for the
weapons system acquisition must be clearly specified. These
goals are derived directly from the need and should reflect
the planned resources allocation to meet the need.
Not only must the goals be clearly specified; they must
be prioritized, or weighted. The reason for this requirement
is that major project goals (cost, schedule and performance)
are Interdependent. A schedule change for example, will inev-
itably result in a cost change, particularly in an inflation-
ary economy. The generally inverse relationship between acq-
uisition cost and total life cycle costs was noted in Chapter
II, Permanent performance deficiencies may result in a
remaining gap in the need which must be filled ultimately.
It is impossible to optimize simultaneously interdepen-
dent goals. Some directives and project plans, however, seem
to require this. For example, a recent Chief of Naval Opera-
tions directive notes that there had been little documentation
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available " of the effort expended to maximize ships '
mission effectiveness while at the same time minimizing
ship costs . " (emphasis added)
For the most part, however, current policy directives
refer to a need to achieve a proper balance between major
goals. For example, Secretary of the Navy Instruction 5000.1
"System Acquisition in the Department of the Navy", specifies
"Continual tradeoffs shall be performed to optimize
the balance between Initial acquisition cost,
estimated life cycle cost, schedule, and operational
capability." (emphasis added)
Ttie proper balance, i.e. the priority of goals, as well
as actual selection of the goals, should be tailored to each
project as the requirements of the needs and the priorities
of the needs are different. Further, the relative importance
of the goals should be specified prellminay to the search for
the "best" system to fill the need. As noted in the 1972
5
"Report of the Commission on Government Procurement",
"The need should be separated from any particular
system, and goals should be defined independently
of the performance, cost and schedule characteristics
of any particular system the exploration of
alternative solutions requires that these things
be specified.
A statement of the problem to be
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solved or the deficiency in mlseion capa-
bility, including those conditions that
have created the problem or deficiency.
* '^^ goft^s to be achieved by the acqui-
sition program and their relative import-
ance , including level of mission capability,
program cost and when the capability should
be available.
The boundary conditions that Bust be met
by any system, including constraints on phy-
sical size, operating conditions, tactics,
and the talents of the users."
(emphasis added)
Once a specific ship acquisition project is formed in
response to the need, the prioritized goal set should be
formally specified in the project's charter. This will
provide the acquisition group with the specific guidance
needed to conduct consistent tradeoff analyses.
DEFINITION OP SUCCESS
Different ship acquisition participants and obervors
view success differently. As previously noted, some empha-
size achievement of one or more short term goals, others
are interested in only the long term worth of the acquisitioa
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Assuming that a prioritized goal set is established
which accurately reflects the requirements of a legitimate
need, the only definition of success in ship acquisition
which maKes sense is how well the actual results of the
acquisition match the goals, including their relative
6
importance. The goal set must be flexible to the point
that it continues to reflect the requirements of a changing
need.
CRITERIA CONSIDERATIONS
The selection of appropriate standards by which to
measure actual results against is not always clearcut. The
choice is influenced by the goal in question, the phase of
the acquisition, the observability and measurability of the
data, and whether the assessment concerns actual versus
planned results or one ship class against another.
Estimates for the major goal areas arc required in the
Operational Requirement Docximent which is prepared prelimi-
nary to Conceptual Design. These estimates are changed and
refined as the design progresses. The estimates become
thresholds when written into a Secretary of Defense approved
Decision Coordinating Paper after the first Defense Systems




Most Important to meaningful evaluation Is that changes
to estimates are fully substantiated as to cause and are
completely documented. Traceability of estimates permit the
evaluation results arrived at by using one standard to be
adjusted for a prior or later standard as desired.
No one type of criteria Is feasible for the evaluation
of all the different aspects of a ship acquisition. The
question of quantified versus qualitative criteria was addres-
sed previously. Performance measures for complex systems are
generally probabilistic at best, usually in the form of plots,
The necessary combination of such criteria to arrive at
higher level systems and functions evaluation results in an
increasing need for Judgment.
Measurement of results in the cost area can be mostly
quantitative and in the form of variaince analysis (meaning
comparison of actual results to planned results rather than
the statistical definition). The major questions to be an-
swered are what are the appropriate costs to evaluate and
what are the appropriate baselines to use. Still, Judgment
of the economic environment in which the acquisition took
place is necessary in order to determine controllable and
uncontrollable effects on costs.
The assessment of success in the schedule area deals
primarily with how closely the ships are delivered to the
schedule determined from the need. Quantitative variance
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analysis is useful here also. The choice of what is the
appropriate "required schedule" may not be elearcut.
After a short discussion of data requirements for the
evaluation system, individual sets of criteria for each of
the major goal areas will be developed in detail. Then,
two different approaches to the combination of those criiieria,
so that an overall evaluation of success can be arrived at,
will be developed.
DATA REQUIREMENTS
The evaluation system should have the data available
that is needed to describe accurately the acquisition and
permit in-depth assessment of what its results were and why.
What must be avoided is the collection of data which is dupli-
cative, irrelevant or more costly to collect than its value.
It is difficult to imagine that new data systems will be
required to implement the evaluation system due to the numer-
ous data sources discussed previously. The new function pro-
posed is primarily that of collecting and assimilating data..
Close adherence to DOD Directive 5000.19, "Policies for
the Management and Control of DOD Information Requirements",
will help ensure data requirements are economical and concise,
This directive directs that new information requirements be





The performance of the ship system is key when conslder-
7
ing the relative worth of ships. An acquisition may be
delivered on schedule and meet its cost target, but if it
fails to perform the missions required of it, in no sense
can it be considered successful. Conversely, in the opinion
of at least one Ship Acquisition Project Manager interviewed
by the author, costs and schedule overruns do not remain
visible for long after delivery of the ships and thus the
performance of the units is the only goal area which counts
in the long run. The weakness of this viewpoint lies in the
insidious effect acquisitions which are out of control can
have on other acquisition projects, and thus on the overall
defense posture. Neither short term nor long term goals can
be ignored.
SHIP PERFORMANCE DEFINED
The definition of ship performance must include any
feature that impacts directly or indirectly on the ability
of a ship to carry out its assigned mission. This broad
definition was earlier offered by Graham. Graham includes
combat ability (first and most important), mobility, surviva-
bility, habitability, maintainability, and future capability
within the scope of the definition. Eckhart points out that
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any measure of ship effectiveness must include availability -
9
"ships at sea versus ships in being". Sanders reiterated
10
the point as follows
"Too many of our ships are only partially
ready to carry out their missions on a
continual basis. This places our Fleet
and Force commanders, , into the
position of assigning tasks on the basis
of which ship is ready rather than which
ship has the most built-in capability to
do the Job."
Depending on how the performance features are defined,
others may be listed, such as the detectability of the ship.
Since a change in capability in one feature area inevitably
impacts on another, the evaluation of overall ship perform-
ance must consider many features, some of which are difficult
to quantify.
For example, a new requirement to increase the size of
the ship's crew will increase, unless compensated for by re-
ductions in other performance features, the displacement
and volume of the ship (possibly as much as 5 tons and 750
cubic feet per man). The increased displacement and size
will slow the ship down and reduce its fuel endurance. To
reclaim this loss in mobility performance will require
increased horsepower in the propulsion plant. This in turn
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will further decrease the endurance and additional fuel
tankage will have to be added. The increased size and weight
of the propulsion plant and fuel tankage increases the dis-
placement and volume of the ship, etc. It goes without
saying that each necessary increase in the ship will add
to the acquisition and other life cycle costs.
Why it is necessary to include all performance features
when considering ship performance is made clearer to the
design layman when an analysis of their impact is made in
terms of "pure" performance, such as the number of guns,
11
as Graham demonstrated. Pbr example, it was found that the
increased space built into our ship machinery spaces (increa-
sed maintainability) designed since World War II is equiva-
lent in impact to two 5" light weight guns on a representa-
tive destroyer. Thus the question, simply put, is "Is the
'tradeoff of larger specific machinery box with armament,
representing a compromise of maintainability and hab-
itability with combat ability, a good one?" The answer to
this question rests in how well the overall results match;::"
the project goals set, i.e., the degree of success.
A FRAMEWORK FOR PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
Objective evaluation of complex system performance




Baumgartner observed in I963,
"The main question to be resolved at this point
In time is how to measure performance and how
to plan performance. Effective answers will
be developed Jupt as surely as the final
performance objectives of a project are
achieved by effort and direction rather
than by accident."
It appears that Baumgartner was overly optimistic as no
completely objective and comprehensive measurement systems
have been developed, to this writer's knowledge, that can
account for different inputs, acquisition environments, and
output form and purpose.
However, the development during the past three years of
the Top Level Requirements (TLR) and Top Level Specifications
(TIjS) process provides the basic framework needed for a con-
sistent and comprehensive (if not completely objective) ship
performance evaluation system. The key, as will be discussed
later, will be to extend this new requirements setting and
performance measure specification process beyond the acquisi-
tion phase.
The following sections will discuss in detail the Top
Level Requirements/Top Level Specifications process and the
contents of the documents. A third key element of the per-
formance evaluation system to be developed is a system of
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consistent procedures for calculating the performance meas-
ures in the Top Level Specifications. An initial effort
in this direction exists and will be discussed. The existing
and planned standardized procedures (termed Performance Anal-
ysis Data Sheets) are presented, as are the Top Level Speci-
fications performance measures, in a composite table of
performance features (from the Top Level Requirements) and
criteria.
The Top Level Requirements/Top Level Specifications Process
As noted in Chapter I, a draft Top Level Requirements,
based on the results of Conceptual Design tradeoff studies
and cost effectiveness analyses, is issued at the beginning
13
of Preliminary Design. Tlie performance requirements in
excess of minimum essential requirements are then traded off
against cost and schedule requirements.
The Top Level Specifications breaks down the performance
statements in the Top Level Requirements into basic func-
14
tions. An operational capability to "search, detect, clas-
sify and track air targets", for example, is divided into the
four basic functions listed. A performance measure is used
for each of the four. The function "search/detect" is logi-
cally measured by range. The Top Level Requirements may
specify a minimum essential value or an acceptable range of
range values. The Top Level Specification, however, will
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state the predicted range performance .-^5
A further example is that the basic operational capabil-
ities in mobility include "speed, endurance, seakeeping qual-
ities, repair capabilities, etc." For an aircraft carrier
escort, the Top Level Requirements may specify a minimum es-
sential speed in a given sea condition but the Top Level Spec-
ifications will answer with predicted speed performance and
16
speed degradation in given sea conditions.
As the Top Level Specifications "presents the achievable
ship within the cost constraint, it may well be that some
performance measures in (the) Top Level Requirements cannot
17
be met ..." A Change in the cost constraint, required per-
formance or design practices must then be negotiated and docu-
mented in the Top Level Requirements and Top Level ^)eclfLMitiona
At the end of Preliminary Design, "final" Top Level Re-
quirements and Top Level Specifications (containing design
specification and performance measures) are issued. Subse-
quently, all changes to either document are serialized and
fully documented. (See Figure 1-2.)
18
Top Level Requirements Content
The major sections of the Top Level Requirements include
Operational Capabilities, Planned Use and Cost Constraints.
The document is a translation of the military need into speci-
fic requirements. A brief description of it contents follows.
A. Operational Capabilities
1. Warfare Areas. This is a description of the
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"combat tasks and functions the ship is intended to perform
in appropriate mission areas". These mission areas, detailed
in thr Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 3301.2, "Naval
Combat Readiness Criteria", include surface warfare, anti-air
warfare, anti-submarine warfare, etc. Ttie "warfare areas"
correspond directly to Graham's "combat ability" performance
feature. The section includes how the ship relies on and
complements the capabilities of other types of units in the
face of particular threats. Requirements related to the de-
tection of the ship by different sensor types and requirements
related to the survival of the ship, e.g. "hardness" to shock
and air blast, are also described in this section.
2' Mobility Area. This includes the "operational cap-
abilities required in the movement and transit of the ship".
Listed in performance terms are speed, endurance, seakeeping,
maneuvering, replenishment constraints and other operational
constraints. Draft and beam restriction ( to allow harbor
and canal passage) as well as damage control and engineering
casualty control requirements are described.
?• Corranand and Contro.^ Ares . This area describes the
provisions for planning and controlling operations of the ship
and associated forces pursuant to the assigned missions. Tlie
extent of the operational capabilities and interfaces with
other systems (by digital computer on large modern combatants)
is detailed.
4. Fleet Support Operations Area. These are the "opera-
tional capabilities required of the ship to provide aid and

support to other units."
^* Non-Coirbat Operations Area. These are the opera-
tional capabilities pxpected which are not directly related
to coir.bat." Included are search and rescue, etc.
B. Planned Use
^* finvi T'onmpnt . This area includes a description of
the ship's expected operating environment as well as its
allow??ble effect on the environment. The standard environ-
mental conditions against which ship and subsystem perform-
ance are to be predicted as well as pollution related matters
are detailed in this section.
-• Operational Availability and Ship Utilization .
This section "describes the ship availability and readiness
to get underway for specific ship readiness conditions in
normal and altered conditions."
3. Maintenance . Overhaul , and Supply Support Con-
cepts . This section is the intended maintenance and support
philosophy for the ship. Minor and major repair frequency
and duration and the level of on board maintenance capability
and repair parts availability are specified.
^' Manning . The "manning philosophy, together with
operational Items which affect manning, such as degree of
system automation, watch requirements, and experience levels
and such other personnel related matters which constrain ship
manning" are detailed here. Habitability and any special
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safety requirements are included.
5. Wartime Use . Itiis section "describes the anti-
cipated operational profile and maintenance cycles during
times of hostilities when the ship is subject to participa-
tion in combat". Subtopics include speed and time profile,
maintenance and overhaul cycle, and operating and logistic
support.
6. Peacetime Use . The same information as that
specified in the above section is presented, but for during
peacetime.
7. Other . In this area are planned use items
which do not clearly fall under the previous six topics.
Applicable exceptions to existing regulations and directives,
as well as pertinent directives which are not normally invok-
ed, are spelled out.
19
Top Level Specifications
The Top Level Specifications, the design answer to the
required operational capabilities and planned use assumptions
of the Top Level Requirements, presents measures of ship
performance and overall ship attributes utilizing three dif-
ferent classification systems. Tliese systems are measures of
overall ship attributes achieved, measures of ship system
functional performance achieved (traces directly to the Top
Level Requirements Operational Capabilities) and measures of
87

performance for ship subsystems.
The ship system functional performance measures included
in the Top Level Specifications are generally the most mean-
ingful ones to the ship operator. This serves the purpose of
the evaluation system well as a primary interest is in the
ship's functional capabilities at the mission performance
level. The performance in any one mission area, e.g. anti-
submarine warfare, may then be assessed by combining evalua-
tions of the relevant functions, e.g. search, detect, clas-
sify, track and engage, of the anti-submarine warfare con-
tributing systems.
In some cases, traceability exists between the Top Level
Requirements and Top Level Specifications performance meas-
ures through common attribute names, e.g. speed, seakeeping,
stability, vulnerability, availability and noise. There also
exists direct traceability between the Top Level Requirements
Habitability Standards and the Top Level Specifications Habi-
tability Summary, the Top Level Requirements Supply Support
Concepts and the Top Level Specifications Supportability,
etc.
Performance Analysis Data Sheets
The Naval Ship Engineering Center, design arm of the
Naval Sea Systems Command, is currently developing a system
to provide "the analytical procedures required to calculate
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the performance measures in the Top Level Specifications for
20
a ship design. The purpose of these "Performance Analysis
Data Sheets" is to "set forth a single method for consistent
application which will precisely define the Top Level Speci-
fications performance measures and make visible all assump-
tions, margins, loss allowances, safety factors, etc., used
21
in its calculation". Performance Analysis Data Sheets
standardized procedures and criteria are not being developed
where it is considered that adequate standardized guidance
already exists.
Performance Measures Set
By combining the performance requirements and con-
straints in the Top Level Requirements, the performance pre-
dictions and measures in the Top Level Specifications, and
by utilizing the existing and planned standardized criteria
calculations procedures specified in the Performance Analysis
Data Sheets, a set of criteria for evaluating a ship's per-
formance throughout its life cycle can be developed. Meas-
urement of "success" in the attainment of performance goals
can then be accomplished by utilizing primarily existing
and planned systems. As noted previously, the major change
required will be to collect actual results data and assess
the performance against the requirements throughout the life
cycle rather than just during the acquisition phase.
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The table in Appendix A contains the proposed set of
performance features evaluation criteria developed as discus-
sed above. Included in the table are
a) the name and a description of the performance
measures and ship attributes considered useful to the evalua-
tion system, generally derived from the Top Level Specifica-
tions,
b) the Top Level Requirements performance objectives
and planned use areas which are directly measured by the
performance measure (indicated by a "T" for direct traceabil-
ity) or are at least partially evaluated by the performance
measure (indicated by an "I" for influence),
and,
c) the standardized procedures for calculating the
performance measures which have been developed, or are plan-
ned for development. Note that only the title or a very
brief description of the Performance Analysis Data Sheets
or other standardized procedure is listed. Where a procedure
is considered inadequate by the author for the purposes of
the evaluation system, or is not known to be planned for
development, a recommendation is included. Such recommenda-
tions are enclosed in parenthesis.
The next two sections will develop criteria of costs and





Acquisition cost is the most visible and controver-
sial factor in naval ship acquisition. This situation re-
sults from the monumental cost overruns of the past two
decades and the huge amounts required to purchase new major
weapons systems. A single new nuclear powered aircraft
carrier costs in excess of one billion dollars to acquire.
Never-the-less, a case was made in the previous chapter
that the total life cycle cost is the more appropriate cost
target to minimize. However, selection of the appropriate
cost goals and their relative iraporteuice for each project is
left to the goal setting process. The purpose of the eval-
uation system is to measure how closely the results match
the original or current aet of prioritized goals.
ACQUISITION PHASE COST CRITERIA
There is no scarcity of cost information during the
acquisition phase. There is a problem, as previously noted,
of obtaining contractor return costs. However, as the de-
gree of engagement with the contractors increases and more
of them meet the Cost and Schedule Control Systems Criteria
(see Chapter I), useful return costs information should be-
come more available and be of greater validity.




Congress concentrate on acquisition costs and contain
detailed .-acquisition cost variance analyses. Acquisition
cost baselines for the evaluation system could be chosen
from the cost estimates reported in the SARS, the Design-
to-Cost constraints, or the estimates in the Decision
Coordinating Papers. These estimates should all be in
basic agreement.
The Naval Sea Systems Command's "Design-to-Cost Guide
for new ships" stipulates that major programs will use
SAR specified guidelines (variance analyses) for explaining
cost growth. The same directive requires that
"A historical record of cost constraints,
cost estimates, actual costs as th^ become
available, and cost influencing factors
will be maintained in order to provide the
basis for explaining any cost increases.
"
The Design-to-Cost constraints are formulated in terms
24
of "unit sail-sway costs". This is defined as
" the estimated unit cost of construc-
tion of follow-on ships as delivered including
government furnished equipment, and the instal-
lation pnd adaption of computer programs but
excluding non-recurring costs and outfitting
cost, in constant dollars of a given fiscal
year, based on a given number of ships in the
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series and a given delivery schedule."
Program acquisition cost variances, as reported in the
25
quarterly SARS, are classified as resulting from
a) quantity change
b) engineering change
c) support item change
d) schedule change
e) unpredictable change (strikes, acts of God)
f) economic change
g) estimating change (due to errors or revisions
in estimating methodology and relationships)
h) contract performance incentives
i) contract cost overruns (underruns)
Iliese reports therefore contain an adequate selection of
acquisition cost criteria and analyses.
POST ACQUISITION PHASE COST CRITERIA
As previously noted. Department of Defense Directive
5000,1, "Acquisition of Major Defense Systems" requires
that "cost parameters shall be established which consider
the cost of acquisition and ownership " (emphasis added).
The Office of the Secretary of Defense Cost Analysis Improve-
26
ment Group charter specifies that the group is responsible
for providing a review and evaluation of independent and
program cost estimates submitted at the Defense Systems
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Acquisition Review Council presentations. The charter fur-
ther stipulates that
"These cost reviews shall consider all elements
of system costs, including procurement, opera-
tions and support as appropriate." (emphasis added)
The "Department of the Navy Cost Analysis Program" was
27
announced in March, 1975. The establishing directive re-
quires that costs be considered
" for all phases of the weapon system, in-
cluding the conceptual, definition, acquisition
and operational .
"
The program requires the Chief of Naval Operations to
a) "Ensure that realistic cost estimates are
provided for the planning, programming, and budgeting of
systems and equipment acquisition.",
b) 'bevelop and maintain a cost data base for initial
and follow on cost estimating, cost review and validation,
and budgeting.
",
c) "Provide guidance and develop costing methodology
to ensure that the total costs of acquisition and ownership
of weapon systems and force units are available to decision
makers."
and,
d) "Maintain force costing models to facilitate




Integration of the various sources and categories of
life cycle costs is required for application of the evalua-
tion system. The above plans and requirements, if carried
through, should result in that integration.
Most of the data will be quantitative, and thus the
criteria can be quantitative. However, some Judgments must
be interjected as to what indirect costs will be charged
to a particular ship class. These overhead charges include
the cost of maintaining and operating support facilities
such as shipyards, repair ships, replenishment ships, sup-
ply depots, etc. Also, qualitative analysis of the effects
of the resource constraints, and the political, economic
and procurement environments is necessary, as previously
noted.
Table III-l provides a summary of the suggested base-
line estimates for the principal life cycle costs categoriei
Actual costs incurred should be available initially from,
the Selected Acquisition Reports submitted quarterly by
the projects, and later from the Chief of Naval Operations
maintained force costing models and data bank. Schedule
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A major consideration, along with low unit acquisition
cost for the Guided Missile Frigate program was to make
contract award for production of the lead ship in less than
28
two years after the requirement was levied in 1971. Two
and one half to three years is usually required for this
process. The design management plan of having the Naval
Ship Engineering Center immediately start Contract Design
upon completion of Preliminary Design and soon afterwards
bring in the lead ship and secondary contractors to aid in
the design was developed primarily due to the schedule
urgency.
The early ballistic missile programs were counted by
most observors as successes rather than failures even though
they Incurred large cost overruns and there were deficien*-
cies in their initial operational performance. They were
"successful" because the goals during the "missile gap" era
put primary emphasis on the early development of some sort
29
of deterrent capability. A JikKD Corporation study of the
ICBM programs characterized them as an example "where an im-




Again, the point to be made is that success should be
measured against the requirements of the need as expressed
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in a prioritized goal set. It is entirely possible that, at
least initially, rapid introduction of the system into the
operating forces will be the dominant requirement.
As is the case for acquisiticMO costs, the delivery sched-
ule of a new ship class is monitored in the Decision Coordi-
nating Paper/Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council
and the Selected Acquisition Report processes. Delivery
schedules are often unstable as a result of one or more of
the below reasons,
a) overly optimistic estimates of development and
construction time,
b) cost increases which force reductions and delays
in awarding production contracts,
and,
c) yearly fluctuations in the number of ships author-
ized by Congress.
The actual delivery schedule is known well before actual
life cycle costs and mission performance results. The recom-
mended criteria is a simple variance analysis, as required
by the Selected Acquisition Reports, using the baseline
estimate as contained in the Decision Coordinating Paper.
Schedule variances resulting from the causes cited above
will require qualitative analyses of their effects.
In the remainder of this chapter, the combination of




Having selected approptiate individual criteria for
features of each of the three major goals, it remains to
assess the combined results of the measure. One of the
prerequisites specified was that clearly defined, priori-
tized goals would be stated for a project as derived from
the established need. This can be done by simply ranking
the goals in order of priority or by assigning weighting
factors to the goals.
S<ich a specification of goal priorities can be viewed
as the utility function, or criterion, to be optimized in
the new ship class. As the goal weighting is determined
from the requirements of the need, it may be necessary to
change the respective weightings as the ship class progres-
ses through its life cycle. A key element of success of a
given project will be flexibility enough in the design to
adapt to new mission requirements and resource constraints.
Comprehensive documentation and tracking of the goal speci-
fications will permit the evaluators to ii^tigef inrtell,egbntiy
the degree of success relative to the current or past goal
sets, or utility functions.
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INDEPENDENT EVALUATION OF MAJOR GOALS
A strong case has repeatedly been made against evalua-
ting one or the other major goals singaJt'ly. llk> ypettormsxai^
level is worth any cost, and likewise, inadequate perform-
ance to accomplish the mission requirements is no bargain.
The requirements of the need and the relative priority of
the need to other defense needs must be considered. Only
by evaluating total resxxlts against the prioritized goal
set can actual success be Judged.
This is not to say, however, that the comprehensive
data collected on ship acquisitions should not be utilized
for comparing results in any particular area or for improv-
ing single design procedures and historically based estima-
ting relationships. Such uses should be eo«e of the major
benefits of the evaluation system.
OVERALL EVALUATION MODELS
Two approaches to integrating the criteria into an
overall evaluation model will now be discussed. The approa-
ches are basically the same, but differ considerably in their
sophistication and degree of automation.
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A Manual Evaluation Model
Existing and already planned systems have been utili-
zed to a great extent in formulating individual goal feature
criteria and for data sources for the evaluation system. It
is, in fact, the emergence of these new systems which have
made comprehensive evaluation throughout a ship's life cycle
possible.
In order to combine the interdependent criteria and
goals, some sort of model must be utilized. The first ap-
proach to constructing and using an evaluation model contin-
ues the low additional resource requirement theme. In ad-
dition to low resource requirements, a simple approach
which relies heavily on the Judgment of the evaluators
recognizee the following,
a) the extreme complexities of the system being eval-
uated,
b) the intricate interdependencies of cost, perform-
ance and schedule goals,
c) the difficulties of finding relevant quantified
measures for every goal area,
d) the uniqueness of every project which will require
a different evaluation model in each case,
and,
e) the problem of reducing every measure to a common
dimension to permit straightforward combination.
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These problems raise serious doubts about the validity and
usefulness of a computerized model which would basically only
require data input and then, with little evaluator maftlpula-
tion, turn out an overall assessment of success.
A simpler, manual scheme will probably produce as good
or better results at lower cost. The qualitative Judgments
necessary to make the results meaningful negate the value
of a computer aid. Additionally, the assessments will be
more acceptable to acquisition process participants, due
to the relatively simpler approach used to arrive at them.
So go the arguments.
The Basic Scheme
In each goal area, the myriad of data inputs would be
collected and assessed using the individual criteria settled
upon at the inception of the project. The evaluation criteria
should have assigned to them distributed weights indicating
the relative importance of each subsystem or subarea being
measured. These criteria and the W6ighting of them should
be developed by the acquisition project and approved through
the Decision Coordinating Paper/Defense Systems Acquisition
Review Council process. The criteria presented in the pre-
vious sections should be useful.
This is not a completely new requirement for the pro-
jects. Department of Defense Instruction 7041.3, "Economic




"Criteria by which effectiveness can be evaluated
are to be clearly specified at the inception of
a program/project."
Development of the criteria set and assignment of relative
importance weightings to the criteria by the project should
promote acceptance of the evaluation results.
A number of schemes, including weighted point assign-
ments, weighted variances or simply rankings, could then be
devised which would serve to inte{;;rate the weighted criteria
within each goal area. This is the same type process used
by many projects to evaluate contractor proposals submitted
in response to bid requests. Finally, by applying the
weights contained in the utility function (prioritized goal
set) to the results in each of the goal areas, an evaluation
of the overall success of the project is possible.
A great deal of judgment will be required in assigning
the weights and applying the criteria. The evaluation
results will have to be qualified in detail. The subjective
nature of the assessment, though a "number" is arrived at,
should never be lost ight of. The final resulting evalua-
tion, never-the-less, should be far superior to the frag-





Table III-2 presents a sampling of example quantita-
tive analyses for a fictitious ship class. The methods of
calculating the goa] features variances are arbitrary and
other methods may be preferable.
After completion of the individual analyses, the next
step is to assess the quantitative variajices together with
all relevant subjective information. The variances may be
adjusted (reasoning should be carefully documented) or sim-
ply accompanied by modifying qualitative analyses.
The aggregation of variances to higher levels of goal
features can then be accomplished by using pre-determined
weightings. For example, consider the Costs goals. Table
III-3 indicates how the evaluators might calculate weighted
variances which indicate the degrees of attainment of the
Costs goals. The sum of the weighted variances is then
an indication of the degree of attainment of the prioritized
Costs goals.
Table III-4 is an example of how a final figure which
indicates the degree of success of the acquisition (i.e. how
well the results match the prioritized goals set) can be
arrived at. In the example, a negative ^undesirable) overall
variance of .02 from the prioritized goal set is calculated.
This example exercise is only an indication of the
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Costs A .02 .01
4. Conversion Costs .? (.07) (.01)
Overall Costs Weighted Variance (.04)
Table TTI-4
EXAMPLE OVERALL GOAL ATTAINMENT CALCITLATION
GopJ Weighting Variance Weighted Variance
Cost .3 (.04) (.01)
Performance .5 .00 .00
Schedule .2 (.03) (.01)
Overall Weighted Variance (.02)
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evaluators. The admonitions in the previous section against
over-emphasizing or misusing the results of such an analysis
merit constant awareness.
31
A Sophisticated Evaluation Model
Advocacy of a more sophisticated evaluation model for
ship acquisition success evaluation centers around the same
observations of the complexities involved as made in support
of the manual model. However, there is evidence that non-
quantifiable goals and goal attainment criteria are often
largely ignored when evaluation is done on a primarily intui-
tive basis. Goals criteria which can not be easily quanti-
fied should be evaluated by knowledgeable experts and assign-
ed quantified, though subjective, ratings. Truly non-quanti-
fiable goal criteria will serve little useful purpose as part
of pertinent criteria used to determine the degree of success
attained by a ship acquisition project.
Also, the limitation of human mentality severely limits
the number of goal interdependencies that can be analysed
under the previous model. The decreasing costs of time
sharing and batch process computer systems, the steady
advancement of new systems analysis techniques, and the
previously noted continued expansion of defense acquisition
information and control systems (creation, processing and
preservation of large amounts of quantitative and qualitative
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data), all suggest the feasibility of a sophisticated
computerized simulation model.
Beginning in the early 1960's, the Department of Defense
has made extensive use of systems analysis computer models
to aid in appraising alternative weapon systems and to
integrate long term planning with yearly budgeting. This
proposal amounts to an extension of the usefulness of the
long range planning models to include follow up evaluation
of actual results fit to the requirements.
That the final assessment of succes? will be done by
the model, independent of Judgment, is not advocated. As
Hitch stated in I967,
"Systems analysis is simply a method to get
before the decision maker the relevant data,
organized in the way most useful to him. It
is no substitute for sound and experienced
military judgment, and it is but one of the




The first step in building the model is the same as
that for the simpler, manual model. The set of prioritized
goals (the utility function) for the project is specified.
This is the success reference against which the overall
results will be assessed.
Early in the project life, management scientists will
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conduct a series of Interviews with key design, financial
and management personnel associated with the project. The
purpose of their interviews will be to discover the inter-
dependencies of the project goals, subsystem and subgoal
relationships, and the predicted range of effects on project
outcome from externalities such as the funding schedule and
amounts, the procurement and econonic environments, etc.
The relationships will be designed into the simulation
model. The selected criteria will be weighted and entered.
Performance measures represented by probabilistic plots will
be modeled by mathematical functions. Constraints which
describe cost ceilings and minimum performance requirements
will be used to flag "unacceptable" results.
The net contribution that subgoal s attainment will
make towards each of the multiple goals must be completely
structured in the model. This can be accomplished by first
specifying separate probability distributions for every
underlying factor and then specifying factor interdependen-
cies to form Joint probability distributions.
The individual simulations of each of the major goal
areas can then be jointly simulated by the same techniques
as above. This approach is along the same lines as the






As data on 30t,u?!l results become available, they will
be inputted to compare with the original estimated probabil-
ity distributions and point estimates. The latter can be
modified to reflect actual results and an increasingly
accurate assessment of success obtained.
It is doubtful that any ships will ever encounter the
exact operational and combat scenarios set up in the Top
Level Specifications. However, the scenarios can be modeled
in the war gaming activities of the Chief of Naval Operations
organization. Actual ship performance results can be extrap-
olated into the war gaming data bank as they become available
and actual scenario performance predicted with increasing
accuracy. These war gaming results can then be compared
to the baseline distributions in the evaluation model.
The computer model results in combination with qualita-
tive information available to the evaluators should enable
a relatively straightforward assessment of overall project
success. By studying the varying degrees of success of
different projects in conjunction with the projects' differ-
ent imposed acquisition policies, acquisition environments
and management and design techniques, intellegent formulation
of high success potential improvements to the acquisition
system process and structure should be enhanced.
The construction and implementation of the computer
models should be done with as much involvement of project
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personnel as possible. Obviously, special management science
skills are needed. The operations research/systems analy-
sis personnel utilized should have project experience where
possible, and be primarily management oriented. A great
deal of interaction between acquisition participants and
the model builders is an absolute roust if the model is to
be valid and considered useful.
CHAPTER III CONCLUSIONS AND SUMMARY
A ship evaluation system should be objective^ relevant
and feasible. Total objectivity is prevented by the complex
interdependencles and multi-variables involved which are
often difficult to quantify independently, much less when in
combination.
Prerequisites to ship success evaluation include a
legitimate defense need which is best served by a naval
ship, a prioritized set of cost, schedule and performance
goals derived from the need requirements, and definition
of what success is. Success is best determined by how well
actual naval ship results, throughout the ship life cycle,
fit the prioritized goal set.
The final steps in developing the evaluation system are
criteria selection, evaluation model construction, and
provisions for necessary drta collection. Criteria and
data requirements can, for the most part, be met by existing
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and already planned rystems.
Two approaches, differing in resource requirements,
sophistication and degree of automation, have been presented
for evaluating "overall success". The use of a "manual
model" for overall evaluation, it is argued, "^ s preferable
because validity of the results requires a great deal of
judgment be interjected into the system.
The computerized simulation program model, augmented
by the evaluators' judgment, can account for more of the
complex interdependencies involved in evaluating ship
success. However, it requires greater resources to develop
and use and its results may not be as acceptable to acquisi-
tion system participants and observors.
Neither of the models measure up to complete objectivity
We never supposed they would. The manual model is certainly
feasible and could probably be implemented in a short time.
The greatest problem would probably be setting up the col-
lection of the myriad of life-cycle data in a central loca-
ton and processing it to usable form.
The computerized model is less feasible in that it
would take a significantly greater amount of resources to
implement and manage. It Is definitely possible over a
period of a few years, however. Ttie relevancy of either
model is dependent on the skill of those involved in the
construction and implementation of *he evaluation system.
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Although the work required and Its complexity may be
apalling to some, the implementation of either of the two
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Tt Is recommended that a comprehensive ship life-cycle
success evaluation system be developed and implemented.
The framework provided in Chapter III for such a system
should be roughly adhered to. Particularly important to
follow are the concepts of utilizing existing systems out-
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analysis of this decision and a comprehensive trial imple-
mentation of a ship success evaluation system is recommended
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